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Abstract: This article provides a conceptual and empirical assessment of UN 
brokered partnerships that seek to deepen or create inclusive and sustainable 
agricultural supply chains in sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically it appraises the 
decision-making mechanisms, processes of partnership brokerage and project 
implementation within the UNDP Growing Sustainable Business Initiative (GSB) in 
Kenya. The paper argues that the lack of bottom-up participation in decision-making 
mechanisms and the predominantly economic imperatives driving the partnership 
projects have failed to reach out to the partnerships’ intended beneficiaries – Kenyan 
small producers of nuts and mangoes. In conclusion it is suggested that opening up the 
GSB platform might hold the promise of reconciling sustainable business models with 
(some) poverty reduction.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the relationship between the private sector and development has 
witnessed a resurgence of interest within academic and policy-making circles. 
Corporate philanthropy, the traditional form of private sector assistance to many low-
income countries, development initiatives and government- led efforts, has been 
progressively amplified (Utting and Zammit 2006); new public-private partnerships 
between businesses, international organisations, donors, NGOs and trade unions have 
been formed in support of specific development priorities and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and  the practices of and pledges to corpora te social 
responsibility (CSR) are increasingly narrated within a developmental and progressive 
dimension. The intensification of these activities has also been accompanied by the 
emergence of a reinvigorated and recognisable consensus, namely one which views 
the private sector as a developmental agent by virtue of contributing to economic 
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growth, creating jobs, raising income and empowering the poor by providing a range 
of products and services (UN Commission 2004; World Bank 2005; UNDP 2006).  
 
Despite the steady proliferation of global partnerships and their increased localisation 
very little is known about the way in which partnership projects are formulated, how 
(or if) they affect their expected beneficiaries, and whether business realities and 
imperatives can be reconciled with the objectives of equitable and sustainable 
development (McFalls 2007). Based on primary research conducted in Kenya this 
paper offers a conceptual and empirical reading of the political processes and 
performance of partnerships brokered by the United Nations (UN) that primarily seek 
to deepen or create inclusive and sustainable agricultural supply chains in sub-Saharan 
Africa. More specifically, it appraises the local processes of decision-making, 
partnership formation and implementation within the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Growing Sustainable Business Initiative (GSB) in Kenya.  
 
The Growing Sustainable Business Initiative was preliminarily conceptualised on the 
occasion of the UN Global Compact’s second Policy Dialogue ‘Business and 
Sustainable Development’ and was officially launched in cooperation with UNCTAD 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), UNEP (United Nations 
Environmental Programme) and UNDP at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
Development. At Johannesburg hopes were running  high once Kofi Annan 
anticipated that the initiative would become one of the ‘most promising pathway[s] in 
overcoming the poverty trap…and give hope and opportunity to the world’s poorest’ 
(UN Global Compact 2002). In September 2002, UNDP was mandated the 
responsibility of developing and decentralising the GSB concept to its Country 
Offices. The GSB aims and objectives were later defined and elucidated in an official 
document co-produced by the UN Global Compact and UNDP. At this point, the 
overall contribution of the GSB platform was identified as ‘facilitating sustainable 
business and investment by the private sector through a process of multi-stakeholder 
engagement with governments, civil society, the UN family and other development 
organisations’ (UN Global Compact and UNDP). For the GSB the notion of 
‘sustainable investment’ assumes two specific connotations: it is understood as a 
standard business activity such as an investment, acquisition, new production or sale 
closely aligned with the MDGs, and it is a type of economic activity which is actively 
supported by state and non-state actors, including the beneficiaries of such 
interventions (Sandbrook 2002). 
 
Operationally the GSB is coordinated at global, regional and country levels. Globally 
a small team of UNDP advisors, based within the UNDP Business Partnership 
Division, are expected to encourage international companies to take action; they also 
assess the merits and weaknesses of local partnership proposals, manage country- level 
activities and share country experiences. Since 2007 the role of Business Outreach 
Coordinator and GSB Regional Coordinator were created as meso- level points of 
contact between the GSB headquarters in New York, the Regional Bureaux and the 
Country Offices. At country level, where the partnerships unfold, a GSB Delivery 
Mechanism comprising a GSB broker and a Coordinating Group are established in 
selected LDCs ‘where stakeholders agree that there is a need for such programme and 
where the UNDP Country Office is committed to supporting it’ (Day et al. 2005).  
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Since its creation the GSB has expanded its partnership portfolio to twelve developing 
countries1 across the continents of Africa, Europe and Asia. The initiative’s projects 
are primarily market led; this means that agricultural projects and food chains 
development for those at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (Prahalad 2005) such as 
smallholders and rural poor are some of the principal areas of interest and potential 
intervention. In mid 2008, out of 48 local projects listed on the UNDP GSB website 
20 focussed specifically on the development of local and global supply chains for 
fresh fruits, vegetables, nuts, seeds, diary, fish and one even proposed the 
establishment of a local fast food chain in Madagascar.  
 
This paper provides a conceptual overview of the partnership rationale and sheds light 
on the criticisms that have been mounted against its assumptions and postulated 
effects. It then contextualises the initiative at the local level by looking at the actors 
that steer the meaning and determine the feasibility of sustainable business models for 
poverty reduction in Kenya. Thereafter, the paper narrates the unanticipated failure of 
two partnership projects targeting the export market for global macadamia nuts and 
the local market for mango fruit juice and discusses the implications of these 
outcomes. The overarching argument that transpires from the research is that the 
unchallenged economic rationale driving the partnership projects has not reached out 
or significantly benefited their intended beneficiaries - Kenyan nuts and mangoes 
producers. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the potential of the GSB needs to be 
rooted in more open and transparent deliberation and implementation processes to 
ensure that some of the spoils of public-private interventions are shared more equally.  
 
2. The Public-Private Partnership Rationale 
 
Partnerships and Participation  
 
The concept of partnership includes a variety of co-operative arrangements. 
Commonly it does not entail an exclusive relation between the UN (or other 
international organisations) and the private sector, other actors such as governments, 
NGOs, trade unions, consultancies and academia are encouraged to work together 
with businesses and the UN to formulate policies or undertake specific projects as to 
collectively ‘share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits’ (UN 
General Assembly 2003: 4). This is certainly true in the global context where 
partnerships are often justified as a means to narrow the democratic deficit in global 
governance (Reinicke and Deng 2000). Notions of inclusivity and participation are 
not confined to global decision-making processes, once global partnerships move 
from policy to implementation, particularly in developing countries, in principle, they 
are premised upon the assumption that ‘beneficiaries’, ‘communities’, or the ‘farmers 
groups’ agree to the objectives of the partnership and co-participate in its execution. 
The resonance of this rationale is based on the emergence of recent academic and 
policy thinking on ‘stakeholder democracy’ which relies on ideas such as input and 
output legitimacy to assess the democratic credentials and delivery capabilities of 
global and local public-private interventions (Bäckstrand 2006). 
 
                                                 
1
 As of mid-2008 the in itiat ive was active in Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, Cambodia, Indonesia. The GSB p latforms in 
Ethiopia, Angola and El Salvador were abandoned.  
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However, behind ideas such as greater pluralism and participation concerns for power 
relationships are often eclipsed. Partnerships are not only portrayed as infinitely 
inclusive but they also assume that all the actors partaking in the arrangement are 
‘equal’ and hold the same interests and expectations, thus conveying the impression 
that some form of agreeable outcome will be reached. This thinking has and can be 
challenged on several grounds. First, the terms underpinning a partnership can act as a 
powerful disciplinary force which determines who is a ‘key’ stakeholder and who is 
not. If, for example, a partnership is defined as a strategic relationship between 
businesses and an intergovernmental organisation the farmers groups or communities 
potentially affected by the partnership might not be identified as the right or legitimate 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it has been noted that those at the receiving end of public-
private interventions often find themselves in a double position of disadvantage: they 
often live in remote locations away from the centres where decisions about their 
livelihoods are made and they lack the political and material resources to access such 
spaces (Zammit 2003; Newell 2005). In the instances where the beneficiaries of these 
development interventions are given voice concerns have been raised about their 
ability to shape or challenge the issues that are discussed and the objectives that are 
identified (Dolan and Opondo 2005), and the possibility of neutralisation and 
incorporation of critical alternatives within dominant discourse (Thomas 2000:44).  
 
However, it is plausible to argue that such observations obscure a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of beneficiaries as agents. While farmers and the rural poor might 
not often be included in formal decision-making processes ultimately, if sufficiently 
organised, within the spaces where projects unfold they can object to decisions that 
might be perceived as detrimental to their welfare and values. Viewing rural 
communities as passive recipients of new forms of market-based development 
reinforces a deterministic logic of no alternative. Equally, pronounced and increasing 
evidence of ‘lack of inclusion’ can threaten the legitimacy of any public-private 
arrangement and potentially induce the creation of mechanisms for bottom-up 
participation and political representation for the less powerful and marginalised. 
Existing global and local partnerships arrangements brokered by international 
organisations do not embody the characteristics of the kind of democratic and 
egalitarian ‘new multilateralism’ envisaged by Cox (1997), however their tendency to 
replicate geographical and power imbalances leaves open the possibility for the 
contestation and transformation of public-private mechanisms of governance.  
 
Partnerships and the ‘win-win’ Common Sense 
 
The partnership rationale has gained prominence not only because of its inclusive 
features and its ‘win-win’ appeal, as the public and private actors involved in a 
partnership together with its intended beneficiaries stand to gain materially or in terms 
of reputation or efficiency (Nelson 2002). The efficiency and win-win rhetoric 
explicitly uttered within the partnership rationale acts as a discourse of self-
legitimation which detracts attention away from the structural determinants that led to 
the emergence of these hybrid forms of governance. Against a background where 
states are retreating from their social obligations, operational partnerships have been 
conceived, and are commonly justified, as means to solve the inequalities ensuing 
from processes such as increased liberalisation, privatisation and competitive 
regulation but remain premised on the assumption that (more) market-based 
development and the creation of new markets in untapped areas will lead to greater 
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prosperity (UNDP 2007). Noting the contradictory logic of this argument it has been 
suggested that partnerships leave intact the underpinning of the global neo-liberal 
order (Bull and McNeill 2007) and serve as instruments to widen and legitimise 
strategies of capitalist accumulation and its actors (Soederberg 2006). 
 
A number of studies have appraised the more detailed consequences and implications 
of public-private partnerships for the practice of multilateralism and the way in which 
the development discourse is being recast. Bull, Bøäs and McNeil (2004) recount that 
the increased role of a broadly conceived private sector might lead towards a 
distortion in policy priorities, a reduction of developmental objectives to quantifiable 
targets as well as a geographical distortion of development interventions. However, 
rather than proposing that the multilateral system is being privatised, in a later 
publication, Bull and McNeill (2007) acknowledge that multilateralism, can, under 
certain circumstance, modify the practices of private partners as to reconcile 
developmental goals with the needs of the private sector to be recognised as socially 
responsible. Whilst this reading wants to recognise the agency and leverage of 
international organisation it does not explicitly recognise that public-partnerships and 
other voluntary pledges in support of corporate social responsibility (CSR) might 
enhance the structural and discursive power of businesses (Fuchs 2007) and legitimise 
their authority as agents of development. Businesses gain moral standing from the 
association with intergovernmental bodies as the effects of their activities and 
commitments to CSR are sanctioned as ‘positive’, ‘developmental’ and 
‘empowering’, and also benefit from wider access to political network and funds.  
 
What are the consequences of market-based public-private intervention for the 
beneficiaries they intend to serve? Newell (2005: 556) notes that corporate social 
responsibility and public-private partnerships can work for some people, in some 
places and for some time. When such interventions work and appear to achieve 
economic objectives such as offering employment opportunities, income and market 
linkages other contradictions re-surface. Dolan (2005) finds that genuine 
improvements in the working conditions of urban dwellers and rural poor might be 
attained but they often come at the cost of displacing alternative conceptions of 
economic and social life. Referring specifically to the notion of ethical trade and 
sustainable business practices she argues that they ‘not only exclude African (or 
otherwise ‘local’) constructions of social organization but also privilege the labour 
formations and production systems of advanced industrial economies, as rights can 
only be claimed through capitalist wage employment’ (Dolan 2005: 382). However, it 
is important to note that partnerships might never move from the stage of 
conceptualisation, they can be abandoned at any point in time for lack of funding, 
commitment or because the expectations of economic returns do not materialise. In 
such circumstances, unless seed investments in organising, training or infrastructures 
have been made, the ‘beneficiaries’ gain little and lose their title.  
 
3. Researching Public-Private Partnerships in Kenya  
 
This research article critically examines the claims of inclusivity, political processes 
and outcomes of two public-private partnerships brokered as part of the UNDP 
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Growing Sustainable Business Initiative in Kenya. 2 It does so by analysing qualitative 
research material that was collected in Kenya between June and July 2006, follow-up 
email correspondence and additional desk-based research conducted between 2007 
and 2008. In the first part of the paper I specifically draw on semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted with civil servants and temporary staff at UNDP 
Kenya and all the active members of the GSB Kenya Coordinating Group. The elite 
interviews with these members focussed primarily on the reasons for partnering with 
the UNDP, the  perceptions on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the initiative and 
the experience of partaking within the decision making group.  
 
In the absence of previous research on the initiative the insights gathered in the first 
phase of the field trip heavily guided the selection of the two partnership projects 
appraised in this paper. There is often a tacit disjuncture between the official claims 
emanating from the websites and press releases of international organisations and the 
actual practices of public-private partnerships formation and evolution.3 The actual 
status of the partnerships could only be verified with the GSB Broker, the gatekeeper, 
who suggested that whilst it was too premature to investigate recently endorsed 
projects (See: Annex 1), or de- linked projects, the partnerships respectively led by 
Global Entrepreneurs and the Kenya Gatsby Trust (KGT) were the only ones that had 
made substantial progress.   
 
Information on the two case studies selected were elicited through in-depth interviews 
with executive members and project managers, documentation supplied by the two 
lead organisations, update reports presented to the UNDP as well as the official 
minutes of the Coordinating Group meetings. Whilst the narratives presented in this 
paper rely primarily on the accounts of ‘elites’, the research also sought to apprehend 
the perspectives of a group of farmers. A three days visit to Embu was facilitated by 
Global Entrepreneur’s Food Engineer.  In the rural periphery of the town semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the management of Mt. Kenya Nuts and 
smallholders, namely fifteen members of ten households living in close proximity to 
the factory. The interviews with the farmers sought to determine whether the 
beneficiaries were aware of a partnership taking place, whether any changes had 
ensued since the partnership officially began in 2005, and what issues were affecting 
the livelihood and welfare of the producers. A commensurable visit to the expected 
beneficiaries of the KGT-led partnership could not be organised because at the time 
when the field-trip was conducted the target group of the intervention was changing. 
Rather than constituting a hindrance to the research this has been effectively treated as 
a clue to illuminate how beneficiaries are selected and for what reasons.  
 
                                                 
2
 This article derives from research material elicited for a wider research on the UN Global Compact, 
an initiat ive which is commonly portrayed as the premier global public-private partnership. Whilst 
conducting qualitative interviews in New York in December 2005 a number of UN civil servants 
suggested looking more closely at processes of partnership formation and implementation in support of 
the MDGs at country level.  Kenya and Tanzania were identified as locations where I could investigate 
the politics of forums such as the UN Global Compact Local Network Kenya and one of the Compact’s 
ancillary initiat ives, the Growing Sustainable Business Initiative, which operates in both countries. 
3
 This is not to say that the information is not accurate, sometimes it is simply not updated because of 
lack of personnel and resources  – a commonly acknowledged problem in UN Country Offices. 
However, whilst conducting research on the GSB it was also found that once the partnerships database 
are updated ‘failed’ partnerships are removed without explanations as to why specific pro jects were 
abandoned or de-linked from the GSB. 
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The ‘case study’ method employed in this research paper has culminated in a two-tier 
analysis which discerns the hierarchies and power-relations at work within the GSB 
Kenya and the politics of partnerships formation and evolution. Such method has been 
preferred not only for of its explanatory qualities (Odell 2004) but also because  it 
‘can expose tensions, strengths, weaknesses...or even contradictions’ (McFalls 2007: 
89) in new forms of development interventions as they are rolled out from global 
institutions throughout the developing world.  
 
4. The Growing Sustainable Business Initiative in Kenya: Actors, Processes and 
Projects 
 
Following consultation with the Kenyan government, the private sector, the NGO and 
the donor community, UNDP in partnership with UNIDO (United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization) and the ILO (International Labour Organization) 
launched the Global Compact and the GSB in Kenya on the 3rd of May 2005. Both 
initiatives officially took off at the same time, however while the UN Global Compact 
Kenyan network was only established two years later, the GSB had already identified 
and presented to an invited audience three partnership projec ts and was keen to 
establish a Coordinating Group as soon as possible. Although the GSB broker was 
expected to run and coordinate both, existing Kenyan Global Compact’s signatories 
(i.e. Tetra Pak and Vestergaard Frandsen) were encouraged to conceptualise and 
initiate sustainable business projects, while companies that expressed an interest in the 
GSB did not have to sign up to the Global Compact or, at times, they were not even 
made aware of the Compact and its principles. The initial, almost exclusive, focus on 
the systematic development of the GSB in Kenya was not solely based on the need to 
show that the idea was viable and ‘pro-poor’ but also because pushing two separate 
initiatives was proving to be an onerous task for a single civil servant.  
 
The Brokers  
 
Within the GSB mechanism and processes, the role of the broker is crucial in defining 
the ‘success of the initiative’ (UNDP 2007). The broker is not only expected to 
identify and coordinate individual projects while minimising the risks and cost 
associated with an investment he/she is also expected to make sure that these projects 
have a clear development dimension and are aligned with the goals of the UNDP, 
particularly the MDGs. In Kenya a new GSB broker was appointed on a yearly basis; 
the first two brokers fitted within the general UNDP job description of a candidate 
with extensive experience in the private sector, the capacity to provide analysis of 
business models including investment analysis and financial modelling, and the ability 
to convene coalitions of partners. Both brokers worked for a number of years in the 
private sector and although interested in development they did not have any 
experience of poverty reduction strategies and interventions. An interview with a 
broker confirmed that the kind of development sought after by the GSB was 
primarily, if not exclusively, economic, once a GSB civil servant stated that ‘our 
priority is to develop new markets, creating employment and providing 
income…development will trickle down’ (Interview, UNDP, 6 July 2006).  
 
Brokers are also expected to establish the Coordinating Group, identify business 
partners interested in developing a sustainable business projects and forge linkages 
between businesses and local NGOs. The ability to act as a nodal point and 
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partnership broker appears to necessitate an in depth knowledge not only of local 
market conditions but also of the various development institutions, groups and actors 
working in the country and often carrying out work away from the capital city where 
the UN compound is based. Although UNDP Kenya had a long tradition of 
collaboration with a wide range of local private and public groups all the appointed 
brokers have been foreign nationals who, upon appointment, have been required to 
map and thereafter make contact with ‘key’ partners.   
       
The Kenyan Coordinating Group  
 
The decision-making mechanism through which the GSB’s targets are set, projects 
approved, and consensus on the meaning of sustainable business is reached, is the 
GSB Coordinating Group – an umbrella group made of government representatives, 
businesses, NGOs, international organisations and relevant bilateral and multilateral 
donors (UN Global Compact and UNDP 2002).The Kenyan Coordinating Group was 
established shortly after the GSB’s launch, its members had a history o f institutional 
affiliation with the UN or were invited to become members by virtue of the scale of 
their involvement in private sector and development types of activities. The 
identification of the right or appropriate stakeholders did not seem to conform to the 
aspiration of closing the democratic deficit in global governance; rather, it mirrored 
concerns such as status, previous contacts with UNDP Kenya and the willingness to 
participate and devote time to the GSB processes. Official documentation suggests 
that these groups should be ‘inclusive’ however, on closer inspection, those who 
partake in formal decision making processes are largely private sector representatives, 
and a handful of local organisations with long-standing interests in facilitating market 
expansion and deepening4 such as African Management Services Company (AMSCO) 
and the Kenya Gatsby Trust. The participation of donors, international development 
institutions and NGOs was minimal whereas trade union and the Kenyan National 
Federation of Agricultural Producers had been simply forgotten (Interview, UNDP, 6 
July 2006). Furthermore, despite recognising the importance of including government 
officials within the coordinating mechanisms, the participation of public officials was 
limited and inconsistent. 
 
When questioned about the representativity of the group the emerging consensus was 
that the supposed beneficiaries of the partnerships did not need to be included in 
deliberations. One member of the Coordinating Group commented that ‘when you 
bring the farmers in they tend to bring their own interests and they are not very 
objective. We, on the other hand have no direct or vested interest, we think about the 
whole community and not about individuals…I would feel as if I let the farmers down 
if I did not attend a meeting’ (Interview, KGT, 14 July 2006). Another member from 
the private sector added that ‘the Coordinating Group is broad enough and if a labour 
union was to be invited to join they would not represent the non-unionised farmers’ 
(Interview, Export Promotion Council, 20 July 2006). Likewise, the GSB broker 
never questioned whether the group could be made more ‘inclusive’ or whether the 
projects’ beneficiaries should be consulted at any point of the partnership processes, 
preferring instead to focus targets such as number of projects, commercial feasibility 
                                                 
4
 Ronen Shamir (2004) defines these organisations as Market Non-Governmental Organisations 
(MaNGOs). 
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and potential outcomes rather than developing participatory mechanisms of 
deliberation and implementation.  
 
Identification, Endorsement and Project Portfolio  
 
During the early stages of institutional development UNDP New York contacted 
various foreign companies and multinational corporations who would be potentially 
interested in developing sustainable business models in Kenya and then passed on the 
details to the GSB Kenya. At the same time, the local broker was also urged to contact 
foreign companies and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in an effort to 
establish a preliminary project portfolio. Both strategies showed early signs of success 
which was further amplified once the Coordinating Group member started to ‘spread 
the word’ about the GSB business proposition and the possibilities of co-funding it 
offered for market research and socio-economic feasibility studies. The second broker 
was determined to reach out to a wider audience and, in collaboration with a small 
team of UNDP interns, contacts with the local media were made and boisterous 
articles on the GSB appeared on the Kenya Times and the Daily Nations in 2006, 
which were later followed by a nomination at the Africa Investor Awards 2006. At 
this point the broker was no longer on the lookout for potential business partners as 
the UNDP was being directly contacted by local enterprises (Interview, UNDP, 6 July 
2006). 
 
As expression of interest started to increase the GSB Kenya pioneered the 
development of more specific guidelines to assess the economic and social impact of 
proposed partnership projects. Initial screening was undertaken by the broker on the 
basis of a clear delineation of the business case and social impact of each initial 
proposal, ‘a project which does not present a convincing business case, despite having 
strong social impact, cannot be considered a GSB project. Likewise, a project that 
makes business sense but cannot sufficiently demonstrate sustainable development 
impact will not be endorsed by the GSB’ (Personal Communication, 7 July 2006). In 
order to be considered for formal GSB endorsement and potential co-funding every 
business was requested to outline in writing or verbally present to the Coordinating 
Group the project description, the business case and financial plan for engaging in a 
new venture or market development as well as indicating its supposed development 
impact, which for the majority of proposed projects equated to an assumption of 
potential rise in employment and income (See: Annex 1). It is important to note that 
businesses were ultimately left with the responsibility to select the supposed 
beneficiaries independently of whether these were ‘poor’ or not.  
 
Between 2005 and 2007, 18 projects were presented and positively reviewed during 
the bi-monthly Coordinating Group meetings (See: Annex 1). Eight partnerships were 
subsequently de-linked from GSB Kenya and pursued without GSB assistance 
because companies did not need the platform and co-funding or were subsequently 
moved to other countries. For example, Tetra Pak moved to the GSB Tanzania to 
explore the development of an integrated supply chain for UHT milk. Out of the 
remaining (officially endorsed) ten partnerships, those ‘dumped from UNDP New 
York’ with MNCs such as Voxiva, Freeplay and Microsoft did not take off due to low 
commitment, diverging interests and communication problems arising from the fact 
that some of the companies did not have offices in Eastern Africa.  
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Unlike the original expectations, the currently active seven partnerships are those 
which might also hold the greatest developmental potential not only because they are 
led by Kenyan companies but also because they intend to create explicit linkages with 
local firms and, in the case of agricultural interventions, small producers (Jenkins 
2005: 252). The preponderance of proposed and existing projects targeting the 
agricultural sector and smallholders is not casual; agriculture and food production 
constitute the backbone of Kenya’s economy with more than two million outgrowers, 
labourers and brokers working to meet the demands of local consumption and the 
export market (Dolan and Humphrey 2004; Brown and Sanders 2007). However, the 
sectoral concentration of agricultural and food projects did not arise primarily out of 
concerns for poverty mitigation in rural areas, where poverty is highest and 
agricultural production is the main form of subsistence (Freeman, Ellis and Allison 
2004), but because market demands and research established that substantial returns 
could be made from smallholders’ flexible and cost-efficient production.  
 
5. The Growing Sustainable Business Initiative in Action: Global Nuts and Local 
Mangoes  
 
How do the GSB sustainable business models work? The approval and endorsement 
of two distinct projects, a global supply chain for macadamia nuts and a local supply 
chain for mangoes occurred in 2005; they were amongst the first group of projects 
formally endorsed by the GSB Kenya and the Coordinating Group and, as 2008, they 
are both still listed as ‘active’ in the GSB global website as well as the UNDP Kenya 
website. Although the GSB Kenya is still developing and testing the brokerage of 
partnerships, project implementation and supervision, the narratives and 
developments of both projects indicate that global and local market demands have 
resulted in both projects failing to bear any financial and non-financial benefits to 
their expected beneficiaries – the smallholders in Embu and Malindi.    
 
Global Entrepreneurs, Global Nuts and Macadamia  
 
Between 2002 and 2004, as part of its expansion strategy, the international trading 
company Global Entrepreneurs International (GEI)5 set up a new office in Kenya - 
Global Entrepreneurs Africa - in an effort to open up opportunities for the export of 
locally produced spices, beans and nuts.  In 2005 the company identified macadamia 
nuts as the prime product for its export activities. Research undertaken by the 
company showed that local production for exports had doubled between 2000 and 
2005 raising from 4,900 metric tons to approximately 10,000 metric tons and that the 
local production and processing market in the hands of Kenya Nut Company had the 
potential to be made more competitive. Global forecast indicated not only that 
macadamia constituted 2% of the world market for nuts but also that Northern 
demands for healthier food products were set to rise. The global scoping exercise also 
found that the global market for the product was dominated by Australian and South 
African producers, and that highly fluctuating prices were primarily dictated by 
criteria such as quality and demand. Within this context the idea of developing a 
value-added niche market for organic macadamia nuts and oil emerged and the export 
                                                 
5
 Historically the GEI was established by AIESEC Executives and it co-funded by the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). 
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company Global Nuts was established in early 2005 as a Kenyan incorporated 
company wholly owned by Global Entrepreneurs Africa.   
 
Once established, Global Nuts started to look for producers with sufficient supplies to 
initiate its export activities and establish market linkages with wholesale buyers in 
Europe. During this phase, the company was contacted by the financial arm of Embu 
Farmers Co-operative Society which owned Mt. Kenya Nuts – a factory which buys 
macadamia nuts from 4000 farmers, processes and packages the nuts for sale to the 
international market. The factory, endowed with the technology to dry, grade, crack 
and package the nuts was not able to sell an overly generous surplus stock and, unable 
to meet loan re-payments it was risking bankruptcy and delayed payments to farmers. 
Global Nuts decided to source macadamia nuts from Mt. Kenya Nuts who ‘promised 
extremely optimistic supply forecast’ (Interview, 13 July 2008), however the first 
transactions were hampered by the fact that Northern buyers did not have much 
confidence in the quality of Kenyan nuts and Mt. Kenya Nuts was unable to deliver 
the specified quantity of 14 containers. By November 2005, thanks to a cash advance 
only 4 containers were shipped to Europe and the Middle East. Visits to the factory 
established that much of the inventory was made up of raw nuts (e.g. nuts originating 
from shaken trees), purchases of nuts from farmers and middlemen were made on an 
ad hoc basis, the equipment was not being used correctly as the factory staff did not 
know how to operate the machines and the factory was in need of thorough clean up. 
Global Nuts determined that capital and human resources were needed to resuscitate 
the fortunes of its main supplier.  
 
Contacts had already been made with the GSB in the summer o f 2005 but neither 
Global Nuts nor the GSB broker could clearly determine how the UNDP could 
provide assistance, despite this the project was included in the portfolio’s pipeline. 
The definition of a GSB sustainable business model with a development dimens ion 
occurred much later, by accident rather than design. While travelling for business 
Global Nuts was introduced to a Japanese consultant6 from HardNut International 
who had extensive experience in the Kenyan macadamia industry and had worked for 
Kenya Nuts Company7 where he oversaw propagation, grafting, harvesting, nuts 
collection and processing. With the possibility open of having a consultant to provide 
advice and production and processing, while the marketing was already being 
developed by Global Entrepreneurs (i.e. website, packaging, publicity, trade fairs), 
Global Nuts re-approached the GSB with a preliminary plan for co-funding the 
consultancy service and was encouraged by the GSB broker to finalise the project 
proposal.  
 
The ex-ante project proposal was developed entirely by Global Nuts with input not 
being provided by smallholders or the factory board whose relations with Global Nuts 
were increasingly strained by signs of internal instability and poor management, the 
refusal of Global Nuts’ financial tendering and the little room for manoeuvre accorded 
to a production and quality consultant installed in the factory by Global 
Entrepreneurs. The project proposal however, had, according to the GSB broker, a 
‘strong’ business and development proposition (Interview, 13 July 2006). The 
                                                 
6
 The bilateral relations between Japan and the Kenyan government dated back to the 1970s when 
Japan’s funding was instrumental in creat ing the institutions, capacities and infrastructures needed for 
the creation of a Kenyan market for macadamia.  
7
 Global Nuts’ main competitor.  
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business case was centred on the assumption that increased quality, direct supply from 
farmers as opposed to middlemen and improved knowledge of manufacturing 
processes and the long-term plan for an organic niche market would have an impact 
on macadamia prices; however it was acknowledged that globally more suppliers 
were entering the market. The development case had two components. First it 
assumed higher and more predictable sources of income for the co-operative’s farmers 
through higher dividends and the premium ensuing from organic certification and 
higher income opportunities for non-cooperative farmers. Second it included, with 
little details and no clear partners in place, capacity building elements such as 
education on the industry, sustainable husbandry,8 loyalty programmes and the 
organisation of farmers into groups (Personal Communication, Global Entrepreneurs 
Project Proposal, 14 July 2006). When it was clarified that the consultant’s role would 
be that of determining profit sharing along the supply chain and designing training 
and loyalty programmes for ‘the farmers’, in June 2006 the Coordinating Group 
approved the project and a sum of $ 10,000 was set aside to co-fund9 the consultancy 
(UNDP GSB 2006 a). 
 
At the time when fieldwork was conducted in Embu, Global Entrepreneurs’ Food 
Engineer had prepared a detailed report on the numerous deficiencies that were 
hindering the production processes but was not allowed to implement any changes as 
the factory did not grant her permission to do so. Mt. Kenya Nuts’ Production 
Manager, who agreed to be interviewed outside the factory gates stated that ‘we are a 
young factory, we need help but the board of directors is too political and it is unlikely 
anything will change’ (Interview, 27 July 2006). The farmers interviewed for this 
study were wholly unaware of any partnership project taking place and had not 
noticed changes in their relationships with the factory. They continued to supply 
intermittent quantities of nuts to the middlemen and/or the co-operative for 15-20 
KSh/Kg,10 while intercropping coffee, beans, maize, bananas, and cassavas for 
income and consumption purposes. Trust that macadamia would provide higher 
income was dismissed in the light of the low number of trees per household (3 to 8), 
limited cultivation space, and the seasonality of the fruit. Such disillusionment was 
vividly expressed by one farmer who stated ‘...I prefer to give macadamia to the 
children instead of selling it...’ (Interview, 26 July 2006). However, all the 
interviewees concurred that they would be better off if the co-operative paid a fairer 
price for the nuts, which was determined at around 80 KSh/Kg.  
 
In Nairobi, while Global Nuts was already investing in its own processing factory in 
the capital’s export processing zones, it continued to hold talks with the GSB 
Coordinating Group about Mt. Kenya Nuts and the Embu farmers but only signalled 
that for financial reasons the factory was unable to produce nuts for the new season 
(UNDP GSB 2006 b). The Coordinating Group agreed that the Minister of 
Cooperatives should be consulted but even with this intervention the project 
terminated in 2007 when the UNDP determined that ‘the co-operative, despite initial 
assurance, was not interested in providing benefits to its members’ (UNDP 2007: 47). 
                                                 
8
 The sustainability aspect of the project was not only relegated to ‘strict environmental and ecological 
guidelines’ free from chemical and pesticides (Personal Communication, Global Entrepreneurs Project 
Proposal, 14 Ju ly 2006), but it  also envisaged the recycling of the nuts’ shells  and use them as fuel.  
9
 Additional funding to follow up on the consultant’s recommendation was expected to come from 
NORAD (US$ 20,000) and Global Entrepreneurs Africa in the form of human resources (US$ 22,535).  
10
 The amounts varied depending on the distance to the collection centres and the need for cash. 
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Global Nuts continues its operations in Kenya, has signed up to the local Global 
Compact network, and it is still listed within the GSB project portfolio. However, in 
order to ensure the survival of its own business it withdrew its ‘assistance’ to Mt. 
Kenya Nuts and the co-operative’s farmers. The GSB could not explain how the 
project could have been run differently, but it is plausible to infer that issue of 
ownership (Witte and Reinicke 2005: 44-46) was not adequately addressed and failure 
to bring Mt. Kenya Kenya Nuts and the beneficiaries to the discussion table might 
have largely contributed to the demise of the proposed project.  
 
KGT, Kevian and mangoes 
 
Unlike the partnership initiated by Global Entrepreneurs, the idea of initiating a 
supply chain for mangoes departed from work that the Kenya Gatsby Trust had 
undertaken in support of facilitating market access for small-scale mango producers in 
the coastal region of Kenya. The Gatsby Trust’s interest in mango production 
developed before the GSB was created. The overarching objective of the Trust, in 
fact, is to catalyse sustainable wealth creation in the poorest areas of Africa and the 
coastal districts of Malindi and Magarini are two of them. In 2001 a series of 
participatory appraisal studies were initiated and found that in the region mangoes 
were overproduced and that they were not being sold due to poor quality (i.e. the 
fruits were infested) and little access to markets, farmers were not organised, a lack of 
secure sources of income incurred exploitative transactions with middlemen with each 
fruit being bought for as little as KSh 1, and that Ministry of Agriculture had provided 
little or no extension services or post-harvest facilities to smallholders.  
 
Between 2003 and 2005, with funding secured from the Gatsby Trust and the JJ 
Charitable Trust, KGT first encouraged mango growers to engage in common 
marketing efforts and improved techniques, second, under an arrangement 
coordinated by the local KGT office, 61 youths were privately trained by Bayer and 
the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) in spraying trees against pests 
while more than 200 farmers received advice on pruning and how to minimise the risk 
of infection (Gatsby Trust n/d). Within two years farmers were organised into13 
groups with membership of 253 and 26 private extension service providers, 
furthermore thirteen demonstrations were set up, a system of farm input supplies with 
a credit component was put in place and a private extension manual was developed by 
KARI as part of the capacity building elements of the project; by 2005 KARI also 
enabled one group to receive quality assurance certification. During this first phase, 
funding from the Swiss sustainable development foundation BioVision also enabled a 
parallel research partnership between KGT and the International Centre of Insect 
Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) in order to develop a non-chemical pest spray based 
on natural ingredients such as peppers and elements of the indigenous neem tree.   
 
Once the farmers were trained and organised and the quality of fresh mangoes was 
deemed suitable for sale, even if quality assurance mechanisms needed to be better 
defined, grading was not possible and collection points remained rudimentary, the 
second phase of the project went ahead and focussed on linking the local mangoes 
market with buyers. Amongst the interested buyers contacted by KGT figured Del 
Monte and local supermarket chain Uchumi. The former did not finalise the 
agreement, however Uchumi did buy some of the mangoes but when it went bankrupt 
the farmers were temporarily left with no buyers.  In a moment of ‘panic’, whilst 
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looking for alternative buyers in 2005 the KGT was introduced to the GSB and the 
first broker put KGT in touch with the Nairobi-based juice producer Kevian 
(Interview, KGT, 14 July 2007). At the time, Kevian had invested in a fruit processing 
plant in Thika (50 Km North of Nairobi) in an effort to decrease high inventory costs 
and avoid heavy taxation on imported concentrate by producing its own concentrate 
for local consumption and export. The contacts established by the GSB proved to be 
successful as Kevian was interested in sourcing local mangoes; hence KGT took the 
lead in facilitating a meeting between Kevian, 26 group leaders and 3 extension 
workers with which the issues of quality, quantity and delivery dates were discussed.  
 
The project was discussed and formally endorsed by the GSB Coordinating Group in 
October 2005 even if the factory had not been completed and uncertainties remained 
over who would supply mangoes to Kevian, though KGT hoped that a deal with the 
smallholders in Malindi could be finalised. This was reflected in the project 
description which vaguely mentioned that ‘the key beneficiaries would be small scale 
farmers in specific districts in the Eastern, Central and Coastal and Rift Valley areas’ 
and in the addition of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
to the partnership11. According to the GSB broker, the proposal also lacked overall 
specificity, as it was not clear whether the project would be economically viable and 
how the quality of the mangoes would be improved (Interview, 16 July 2006). When 
Kevian attended the GSB Coordinating Group meetings clearer information on the 
direction of the project could not be obtained but the company continued to build a 
case for the need to lobby the government to remove excise duties on tax and water 
(UNDP GSB 2005).  
 
In summer of 2006 the factory was almost completed and with a mango creamer 
ready to be installed negotiations with the original beneficiaries, the producers in 
Malindi, were re-opened. Kevian was prepared to pay 13 Ksh/Kg or 6.5 Ksh/ per 
mango, however it also expected for the producers to pay for transport costs which, 
including packing, loading and unloading were estimated to be as high as 5 Ksh per 
mango thereby making a net gain of 1.5 Ksh/per mango. Even though extensive 
research with the eight most reliable transport companies was conducted no deal was 
struck. As the KGT project programme officer stated:   
 
‘…If Kevian is not prepared to pay for the transport costs 
then the partnership would have to come to an end. The 
export market is much more lucrative as the farmers would 
gain a net profit of 6 Ksh per kg of mango and the farmers 
would not have to incur transport costs. The only way for 
the economic partnership to be resurrected would be for 
Kevian to consider absorbing the transport costs, however 
Kevian is not a philanthropist and this alternative would 
have to make business sense, especially considering the 
ascending costs of fuel. At the bottom line of the 
partnership economic considerations need to be prioritised. 
The processing factory is 50 km away from Nairobi…10 
hours drive away from Malindi…’  
                                                 
11
 GTZ,  with self-funding for the project (GTZ PPP Fund), was entrusted with the responsibility of 
looking for more suppliers of high quality mangoes in the Central districts 
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Despite the setback, and with no particular concerns for the smallholders in Malindi 
which continued to be independently assisted by KGT12, the GSB continued to 
support the Kevian project. In 2006 members of Coordinating Group visited the 
factory and were pleased ‘with the opportunity to see the factory processing passion 
fruit and the state of the art equipment’ (UNDP GSB 2006 b). In the meanwhile GTZ 
was able to trace mango producers closer to Thika and the beneficiaries were re-
identified according to cost and quantity criteria, and the districts of Emebere and 
Embu were chosen to start anew a farmers’ training programme. However, even if 
new smallholders were identified and the Ministry of Agriculture had agreed to offer 
extension services, there was no defined capacity building plan in place that would 
have ensured that the ‘new beneficiaries’ would be in a position to meet the quality 
and quantity demands imposed by Kevian.  
 
6. Discussion: the Implications of Market-Based Development Strategies 
 
Both case studies illustrated that the project definition and the project direction was 
ultimately defined by businesses and dictated by economic priorities with UNDP not 
raising questions about the marginalisation of the beneficiaries, their role in the 
projects, their expectations and knowledge. At no point were the intended 
smallholders invited to the discussions taking place at UNDP and empowered to make 
basic decisions about their livelihoods – economic opportunities were catapulted from 
the outside and changes to the project plans were defined in Nairobi. Omitting the 
question of who defines and drives sustainable business projects is to reinforce the 
apolitical notion that partnerships are ‘neutral’, infinitely inclusive and that all the 
‘stakeholders’ and beneficiaries involved have an equal say. This observation echoes 
the arguments put forth by an emerging body of critical scholarship on corporate 
social responsibility and public-private partnerships which  has observed that in 
multistakeholder forums and meetings those who normally don’t have a voice in 
society are also the ones excluded from the discussions (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006: 
984).  
 
Second, the question of distribution of benefits deserves some attention. As Blowfield 
(2007) asks, what assumptions can be drawn about the impact of these interventions? 
Within the GSB model, lead companies gain from the association with the UNDP 
name and the publicity that comes with it, here the reputational gains are substantial 
and should not be underestimated. As the cases of Global Entrepreneurs and Kevian 
testify the GSB opened up to businesses opportunities for networking and 
partnerships formation, it offered free guidance on the development of a business 
plan, and was instrumental in allowing businesses to bid for or acquire public or 
private funding and financing. The gains accruing to the private sector are not only 
implicit in the GSB value-proposition but are also cultivated because failing 
partnerships could potentially undermine the entire initiative, its expansion plans and 
donors’ funds. (In)avertedly the GSB platform also created a political space, at the 
Coordinating Group meetings, where, on occasions, the private sector could discuss 
the kind of policy changes, which would be required to foster more profitable and 
efficient economic transactions (i.e. lower taxes).  
                                                 
12
 KGT linked the smallholders to a Belg ian wholesaler and was actively looking into donor’s fund to 
set up a pulp-processing factory in Malindi, at the same time it had started to evaluate the possibility of 
establishing a more lucrative market for dried mangoes.  
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Similar or commensurable benefits have not been shared with smallholders.  At the 
bottom of the supply chains some opportunities for smallholders have been created 
and equally removed. The viability of a sustainable business model is, first and 
foremost, dependent on the market imperative of profit maximisation. Beneficiaries 
are ‘picked’ because they can produce what a company wants at a price and quality 
that is deemed favourable by the buyer. However, even if the prices paid tend to be 
higher than what middlemen offer, buyers have the power and capacity (i.e. resources 
and networks) to relocate their ‘developmental responsibilities’ towards more cost-
efficient producers, as illustrated by the experience of Kevian. Interviews with the 
farmers in Embu suggested that smallholders’ wages continued to be determined by 
formal and informal market transactions; employment opportunities remained 
seasonal and dependent on fluctuating demand. Incomes were dependent not only on 
old and new market linkages but also on family remittances, crops’ diversification 
and, for some, the identification of work opportunities away from the country side. 
Hence, even the modest contributions that isolated sustainable business model and the 
GSB claim to bring in the advancement of the MDGs or sustained poverty reduction 
can be open to challenges. 
 
This however, is not to dismiss entirely the potential value that sustainable business 
models might yield for the processes of development and the livelihood of 
smallholders. The new GSB guidelines for agro-food partnerships specify that several 
capacity building components should be identified prior to the development of a 
supply chain and suggest that quality and productivity improvements, building trust 
amongst smallholders and organising farmers groups should be explicitly integrated 
within project proposals (UNDP 2007: 43). With businesses or governments not 
always in a position to offer such services the delegation of this responsibility is 
expected to fall in the hands of MaNGOs such as GTZ, USAID, CARE, Gatsby Trust 
and TechnoServe. The introduction of this requirement is to be welcomed as opposed 
to the previous approach, namely one that viewed farmers simply as targets of public-
private interventions. The emphasis placed on organising disparate producers into 
groups might in fact offer scope for the producers to use voice during negotiations 
with buyers, as shown by the case of Kevian, and potentially even within the wider 
partnership.  
 
The opportunity that the GSB Kenya has failed to foster is a closer and more 
systematic partnership with local authorities and higher- level governmental bodies, as 
Frynas and Newell (2007: 677) point out ‘even in the most dysfunctional African 
states, with weak government authorities, the state continues to exert an important 
influence on development’. Incorporating more meaningfully public authorities in the 
processes of defining how business interests and developmental priorities might be 
reconciled could potentially contribute to the long-term impact of sustainable business 
models. For example, in the cases discussed lack of transport, inadequate 
infrastructures, information and credit were all identified as factors that hindered the 
furtherance of the partnerships’ developmental dimension and inherently called for 
public policy intervention and the mobilisation of public resources.  
 
7. Conclusions 
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The GSB epitomises an example of proliferating forms of public-private governance, 
and like some of its counterparts such as the now defunct DFID’s Business Linkages 
Challenge Fund or the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, its mandate and 
current global project portfolio place in a unique position to affect the welfare of 
small-scale agricultural and food producers in LDCs. Notwithstanding the initiative’s 
‘learn as you go’ approach, the paper has sought to demonstrate that thus far its 
degree of inclusiveness has been limited, while from the perspective of the 
beneficiaries its development impacts have yet to materialise.  
 
The two cases presented in the paper showed that at no point the expected 
beneficiaries were consulted or included in the processes of deliberation. Furthermore, 
neither the smallholders in Embu nor the mango growers in Malindi reaped the 
benefits postulated within the GSB development proposition. The farmers in Embu 
were caught in between a hostile relationship between a young cooperative and 
Global Nuts, while the mango growers in Malindi lost their status as beneficiaries 
because they were located away from Kevian’s production facilities. Comparatively 
the GSB has nurtured very close relationships with the private sector representatives 
of the Coordinating Group and business partners, and has offered them considerable 
advantages such as political spaces, networking opportunities, publicity and assistance 
in conceptualising and co-funding specific projects. Within the context of debates on 
democratic legitimacy and sustainable and equitable development these asymmetries 
expose the fragility of the partnership rationale and the practice of public-private 
partnerships.   
 
The GSB, however, could be perceived more legitimate and even prove to be more 
effective if all the expected beneficiaries were given more voice in the phases of 
project selection and implementation. Opening up the GSB’s decision-making 
mechanism to representatives of the beneficiaries, other non-strategic and less 
complacent ‘stakeholders’ coupled with the consistent involvement of public 
authorities could improve the prospects of addressing (some of the) developmental 
needs of the beneficiaries, and the expectations, roles and responsibilities of different 
actors within each project. Integrating farmers and other recipients of public-private 
development assistance within the GSB structures could potentially narrow the 
participatory gap identified in this research paper, and offer a space for the agency of 
the (otherwise) politically marginalised – a space where knowledge, values, demands, 
and objections can be openly articulated.  
 
Within the wider UN family examples of bottom-up engagement mechanisms with 
farmers groups do exist. The International Fund for Agriculture and Development 
(IFAD) bi-annual Farmer’s Forum is a testimony that attempts to integrate sma ll 
farmers, groups of producers and governments within policy processes can be 
attained. This is not to say that participation generates ‘win-win’ outcomes and 
eradicates power asymmetries, but that allowing the beneficiaries to actively partake 
in decision making processes leaves open the possibility for partnerships to become 
more accountable and less technocratic.   
 
Employment and income generation are some of the postulated benefits that 
sustainable business models hope to produce but these assumptions need to be 
verified and followed up while closer attention will progressively need to be placed on 
the capacity building elements and the quality of employment relationships that 
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different partnerships  promote, and the wider social investment they might attract. 
The GSB does not currently have disclosure, monitoring or impact assessment 
mechanisms, what is known about ‘development’ primarily comes from the 
information that lead-businesses disclose, but as the existing partnerships develop and 
new groups of beneficiaries are identified the UNDP will have to demonstrate how 
and whether the model works not only to the advantage of private partners but also for 
those it seeks to lift out of poverty.  
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Annex 1: Growing Sustainable Business Initiative in Kenya Project Portfolio 
2005-8 
 
Date  Project Partners Project Description  Development 
Objectives  
Beneficiaries (Other 
than lead company) 
Progress  
May 2005 Grameen, UNDP.  Introduce a ‘Village Phone’ 
model whereby local 
entrepreneurs who purchase a 
telecommunication kit from 
Grameen and its partners 
would provide phone services.  
Enable access to mobile 
phone technology. 
Microfinance Institutions, 
Village Operators, local 
communities.  
De-linked from 
GSB Kenya. 
May 2005  SC Johnson, 
Pyrethrum Board of 
Kenya (PBK), 
Approtec (now 
KickStart).  
Attain higher production of 
natural pyrethrum by 
increasing quantity and quality. 
PBK’s role is to provide free 
clonal seeds while Approtec 
market and sells MoneyMaker 
pumps.  
Increase the income 
raised from the cash 
crop. Give farmers access 
to irrigation technology 
and seeds.  
Support 1 million people 
living in 1$/day.  
De-linked from 
GSB Kenya/Active 
May 2005  Tetra Pak, UNDP. Development of a cereal based 
nutritional milk to be used by 
workers, people living with 
HIV/AIDS, relief zones, 
refugee camps and schools.  
Poverty reduction, 
development of the 
private sector, improved 
health and education, 
improved trade balance.  
Consumers – urban and 
rural poor.  
De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya/ Pilot 
project active GSB 
Tanzania. 
Summer 2005 Export Promotion 
Council (EPC), a 
European Logistics 
Company, an Airline, 
Co-op Bank, GTZ, 
KGT, UNDP.  
Establish cooling facilit ies in 
production areas for perishable 
products, refrigerated trucks 
and storage facilit ies to ensure 
unbroken cold chains to EU 
markets.  
Increased income and 
employment, higher trade 
with the EU.  
Farmers. De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya.   
Summer 2005 Global Entrepreneurs, 
Global Nuts, Mt. 
Develop a global supply chain 
for macadamia nuts and 
Increased income and 
employment, higher 
Farmers, local processing 
plant.  
Active 
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Kenya Nuts, UNDP. strengthen the domestic nuts 
production by working with 
farmers and a local processing 
plant.   
exports.  
Summer 2005 Vestergaard-Frandsen, 
UNDP,  
Development of a water 
purification tool called Life 
Straw, which prevents water 
born diseases. The locally 
produced straw costs US$3 and 
lasts one year.  
Reduce the proportion of 
people without access to 
safe and drinking water.  
Consumers - urban and 
rural poor. 
De-linked from 
GSB Kenya/Active  
Summer 2005 Waving 
Communications, 
UNDP.   
Establishing a mobile phone 
recycling plant to manufacture 
and assemble mobile phones at 
lowering manufacturing costs 
than market standards.   
Enable access to mobile 
phone technology. 
Urban and rural poor.  De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya.  
Summer 2005  D1 Oil, Total, Vanilla 
Development 
Foundation, UNDP.  
Increase the production of 
biodisel produced by Jatropha 
plants and establish a 
distribution network across 100 
service stations across Kenya.  
 
Higher income and 
employment, higher 
production capacities, 
sustainable fuels.  
Jatropha farmers and 
biodisel consumers.  
De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya.  
October 2005 Freeplay Energy, Co-
operative Bank, 
UNDP.  
Freeplay manufactures 
products that make use of self-
sufficient energy. 
Establishment of an East 
Africa distributor to sell the 
products to retailers who have 
been granted a microfinance 
loan. The retailer will sell the 
products using a two-part tariff 
model.  
Improved education 
through employment 
creation and local 
economic development. 
Rural Communities with 
infrequent access to 
electricity.  
Endorsed by the 
GSB 
Kenya/Inactive  
October 2005 Kevian, Kenya Gatsby 
Trust, Africa Insect 
Science for Food and 
Health (ICIPE), 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, GTZ, 
Kenya Federation of 
Agricultural 
Producers, UNDP.  
Creation of a supply chain for 
mangoes to produce locally, 
rather than import, 
concentrated fruit juice.  
Poverty reduction 
through employment 
creation and local 
development. 
Small-scale farmers in 
Eastern, Central, coastal 
and Rift Valley area.  
Active  
October 2005 Microsoft East Africa, 
International Financial 
Corporation (IFC) 
SME Solutions 
Centre, IFC 
Grassroots Business 
Organization, Institute 
for Development 
Studies (Nairobi), 
UNDP.  
Tailoring Microsoft’s Small 
Business Accounting - an 
existing productivity tool target 
application - to suit the specific 
needs of SMEs in Kenya. 
Poverty reduction 
through employment 
creation and local 
development. 
Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises.  
Endorsed by the 
GSB Kenya/ 
Inactive  
December 2005  Ezipei, UNDP.  Creation of an automated low-
value financial payment system 
for microfinance services.  
Poverty reduction 
through the provision of 
microfinance services.  
Microfinance Institutions.  De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya. 
December 2005 Voxiva, Pride Africa 
(Drum Net), UNDP.  
Development of an existing 
information platform, which 
gives farmers access to market 
and financial data through 
mobile phones rather than the 
internet.  
Reduce information 
asymmetries and reduce 
poverty through 
increased sales.  
Farmers.  De-linked from the 
GSB Kenya/Active 
June 2006 Co-operative 
Insurance Company of 
Kenya (CIC), 
Corporate Renewal, 
Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs), 
Nairobi Informal 
Sector Confederation, 
UNDP.  
Make available micro-
insurance services to informal 
traders at affordable premiums.  
Provide the informal 
sector with the protection 
against risks that might 
lower productivity, 
income and circles of 
poverty.   
15,000 informal traders.  Active.  
June 2006 Gamewatchers Safari 
(Porini), UNDP.  
Provide access to water by 
drilling boreholes outside an 
eco-camp in the Mara region.  
Access to safe drinking 
water, increased 
employment and income 
through tourism 
development.  
Local communities.  Active.  
August 2006 Celtel, Psitek, Value 
added Services, 
Increase the usage of Celtel’s 
Simu Yetu community 
Poverty reduction 
through employment 
Payphone operators and 
consumers who benefit  
Active. 
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Packetstream, Pride 
Africa, Health Data 
System, MFIs, UNDP. 
payphones by launching a 
next-generation of data-rich 
GPRS (General Packet Radio 
Service) payphone. 
creation (i.e. 13,500 new 
payphone operators) and 
local economic 
development. 
from lower-cost access to 
money transfer and other 
commercial services. 
August 2006  Suera Flowers, Africa 
Now, UNDP. 
Develop a supply chain for 
Suera flowers, which includes 
investment in cold storage, 
pack-houses, vehicles, trucks 
for collection as well as 
financing facilit ies for farmers. 
Poverty reduction 
through employment 
creation (from the 
existing 250 to 5,000 
jobs). Access to export 
markets through 
certification and quality 
controls.  
Farmers.  Active.  
2007 Honeycare Africa 
(HCA), UNDP. 
Encourage small farmers to 
begin beekeeping and reach the 
consumers at the bottom of the 
pyramid by selling 20g honey 
jars in the slum areas in Kenya. 
Poverty reduction 
through employment 
creation and diversified 
sources of income.  
Small-scale farmers, 
beekeepers and 
consumers.  
Active.  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the UNDP GSB, the UNDP GSB Kenya 
websites and interviews.  
